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Modeling the fulfillment of global properties like surviv-
ability is a challenging problem in unbounded systems
such as Grids, peer-to-peer systems, or swarms. This
paper proposes Folded Interaction Systems (FIS), an
extension of the classic I-Systems framework, to over-
come the modeling issues. FIS is applied to a case
of survivability assessment in Grids and demonstrates
the identification of essential capabilities, the modeling
of harmful incidents, and the derivation of standard
strategies to sustain the survival of a system’s mission.
FIS is not restricted to survivability, it can be used for
investigating the preservation of any global property.
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1. Introduction
The Internet, Grids, peer-to-peer systems, and
swarms over dynamic ad hoc networks are all
examples of unbounded systems. They differ
significantly from bounded systems as they nei-
ther exhibit a common administrative control,
nor does any of their components have a com-
plete view of the (dynamically changing) sys-
tem as a whole, nor may any of its components
exercise control in other system parts [1]. (We
use the term “system” here in its broadest sense
which not only covers hardware and software,
but also human resources. Examples of “com-
ponents” are thus logical entities, human beings,
network nodes, or complete Grid sites.)
A serious problem arises when combining sys-
tems comprising relatively isolated, small-scale
elements into an unbounded conglomerate. As
can be observed in Grids [2], the primary chal-
lenge is not the coordination of the components
for joined problem solving (although difficult
enough). Rather, it is the fundamental require-
ment to preserve the “local” system properties
(e.g., security, robustness, availability) in-the-
large, while at the same time to fulfill the “mis-
sion” of the system-as-a-whole defined by a set
of global properties to achieve. For example,
keeping an essential set of Grid services reli-
able does not only depend on the reliability of
the underlying Grid resources, but also on the
relationships between them [3]. Ensuring that
systems survive their mission – despite the pres-
ence of intrusions or disasters – is the primary
objective of the discipline of survivability [4].
We will discuss this in more detail in Section 2.
Reasoning about survivability is not possible
without a formal system model that is able to
express global properties, their dependencies
on local interactions, the propagation of such
interactions, and the transformation from non-
safeness to again-safeness. Such a framework
is not available today. In this paper we propose
supplementing Interaction Systems (IS) [5]with
foldings for closing this gap. The basic idea is
to use IS for modeling systems and foldings
for model transformations. Folded Interaction
Systems will be introduced in Section 3.
The suitability of the FIS modeling approach
will be demonstrated in Section 4 by exemplar-
ily assessing the survivability of (an excerpt
from) a production Grid authorization frame-
work.
∗ This work has partially been funded by the Seventh Framework Program of the European Commission (Grants 246703
(DRIHMS) and 261507 (MAPPER)).
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In Section 5, we briefly compare FIS with re-
lated work before concluding the paper.
2. The Problem of Modeling Survivable Un-
bounded Systems
The primary objective of survivability is the sys-
tem’s mission to survive instead of single com-
ponents. There are several challenges related to
this (cf. [6]):
1. What is the system’s mission?
2. Which essential capabilities need to survive?
3. What do they have to survive?
4. How can systems be designed with surviv-
ability already “built-in”?
5. How can system components (especially le-
gacy components) be instrumented a poste-
riori to achieve survivability?
6. Howcan survivability be assessed in ametho-
dologically sound manner at design time?
7. Howcan “survivability performance” bemo-
nitored and audited at run time?
While these challenges relate to the survivabil-
ity of any system, unbounded systems exhibit
specific constraints due to their (partial) auton-
omy. In unbounded systems the system com-
ponents belong to different administrative do-
mains. Typically, they are managed by com-
ponent managers. These managers communi-
cate with each other for coordinating coopera-
tive tasks or for sharing resources, but they are
independent otherwise [2]. Within their own
component, however, they completely exercise
control over the local processes by enabling or
disabling local state transitions. The focus is
hence on “distributed control” as opposed to
specific functionality. The constraints summa-
rize to:
1. Some system componentsmay be completely
autonomous (example: humans) while oth-
ers may be strictly reactive (example: stor-
age elements in Grids).
2. Every system component is aware of only
a small set of other system parts (example:
Grid Resource Providers only know their ad-
ministrative domain).
3. System components may trigger (enforce)
activities in other components (example: a
Grid meta-scheduler enforces local resource
managers).
4. System components may be in mutually ex-
clusive states (examples: exclusive access to
resources or forbidden inconsistencies be-
tween End Entity Certificates (EEC) and
Proxy Certificates in Grids).
Related to survivability these constraints trans-
late to questions like: Can components inter-
act in an unintended manner? Are there un-
reachable global states which would partition
the whole system? Is an unintended “coalition”
between system components possible (which
may lead to deadlocks or livelocks)? How can
a system be migrated from a non-safe situation
into an again-safe one?
Discussing such issues in the same modeling
framework is not possible today as there is no
such framework available. We propose Folded
Interaction Systems (FIS), a combination of In-
teraction System (IS) [5] and structure preserv-
ing foldings to close this gap. In the next section
we briefly describe IS before introducing fold-
ings between IS-models.
3. Folded Interaction Systems (FIS)
Interaction Systems (IS) are based on the sin-
gle assumption that every system component
(called part) is in exactly one state (called
phase) at any time. Other than related formal
approaches (e.g., Petri Nets, communicating
Finite State Machines, π-calculus), IS do not
specify the allowed interactions (thesewould be
intractable in large-scale systems). Rather, the
idea is to allow everything and specify only the
restrictions to obey. There are exactly two types
of restrictions: the mutual exclusion of phases
(called coupling), and the uni-directional en-
forcement of phases.
IS are graphically represented as depicted in
Figure 1, where phases are represented by small
circles and parts by rounded rectangles.
The phase a part is currently in is indicated by
a filled circle (the phase token). The set of
phases currently holding phase tokens is called
a case. Directed edges between phases denote
enforcements while undirected ones represent
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Figure 1. Example of an IS
mutual phase exclusions. Inert parts have a gray
background and they are labeled using square
brackets. In Figure 1 (2, 3) and (4, 5) are both
examples of mutual exclusion couplings, while
(1, 4) expresses an enforcement from phase 1
in part a to phase 4 in part [b]. The semantics
behind (1, 4) is that 1 exerts a force on [b] to
leave 4. [b] will then leave 4 unless prevented
by other external influences. As long as 4 has
not been left, however, part a is supposed to stay
in 1. Notice that phases of the same part are mu-
tually exclusive by definition. More formally:
Definition 1. (IS) An IS is a structure IS =
(P, B, I, K, E) with
1. P is a finite set of phases
2. B is a partition of P
3. I is a set of inert parts (I ⊆ B)
4. K ⊆ P × P is a symmetric coupling rela-
tion for expressing mutual exclusion
5. E ⊆ P × P is an enforcement relation for
expressing enforcements between phases
(E ∩ (E−1 ∪ K) = ∅)
The dynamics of an IS is described by the “firing
rule” in Algorithm 1, an axiomatic foundation
of which can be found in [5].
The rule is based on a neighborhood concept.
A neighbor of a phase p ∈ b is any phase q
in a part b′ = b which is related to p by either
mutual exclusion (the coupling relation K) or
by the enforcements of E and E−1. A neighbor
is occupied if it holds a phase token. For exam-
ple, the phase set {1, 5} in Figure 1 defines the
neighborhood of phase 4 ∈ [b] and the occu-
pied neighbors are empty under the given phase
token distribution.
From the behavior graph in Figure 2 we derive
the impossibility of a phase transition 1 → 2
in case {1, 3, 7}, whereas the transition 5 → 7
Figure 2. Behavior graph of the IS in Figure 1
is possible. As an example of a multistage in-
fluence propagation consider a phase transition
in part c from 7 to 5 in case {1, 4, 7}. The
transition would induce part [b] to leave phase
4 to phase 3. Please notice that part a is now
unable to leave phase 1 because of the coupling
between phases 2 and 3.
Require p ∈ b holds current phase token
Require p′ is a potential successor
1: if neither p nor p′ ∈ b have an occupied neighbor
then b may decide to pass the phase token on to p′,
provided b is autonomous (and not inert)
2: if p is enforced by an occupied neighbor phase q then
b has to leave p
3: if p′ ∈ b enforces an occupied neighbor phase then b
may decide to pass the phase token on to p′, provided
b is autonomous (and not inert)
4: if the phase token may not be passed on, then all
neighbors are prompted to leave their current phase
5: no other phase transitions are allowed
Algorithm 1. Local Transition Rule.
Enforced phase transitions often follow a local
Finite State Machine (FSM) transition scheme
(reflecting e.g., internal procedures or policies).
We indicate this graphically by dotted arrows
between phases (as in part VO in Figure 3).
After this preparation, we can now define IS-
foldings as structure preserving mappings:
Definition 2. (IS-folding) Let IS1 and IS2 be
an IS with IS1 = (P1, B1, I1, K1, E1) and IS2 =
(P2, B2, I2, K2, E2). A mapping α: P1 → P2 is
called IS-folding of IS1 into IS2 if it preserves
the coupling and enforcement relations of IS1 in
IS2 (i.e, α(P1) ⊆ P2 and (α(p1), α(p2)) ∈ K2
for (p1, p2) ∈ K1). α is called part respect-
ing if it respects B1 and case respecting if IS2
exhibits the same case transition semantics as
IS1. An IS-folding which is both part and case
respecting is called strong.
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Folded Interaction Systems (FIS) are IS with an
associated family of IS-foldings.
An example of an iterated application of IS-
foldings will be given in the next section when
applying FIS to the survivability analysis of a
Grid authorization framework.
4. Applying FIS to Analyze the Survivability
of a Grid Authorization Framework
Loosely, Grid authorization is the act of pro-
viding and checking the authority of a user or
a Grid job on a specific set of Grid resources.
An IS model (DGAF0) of (an excerpt from) the
D-Grid authorization framework (DGAF) [7] is
shown in Figure 3.
Resources (the inert part [Resource]) are made
available to Virtual Organizations (VOs) (part
VO) by Resource Providers. Access to re-
sources is granted to VO members according
to their “position” relative to the VO. This po-
sition is defined by group memberships (inert
part [Group]) and the role tenancies (inert part
[Role]) within each group. Positions are man-
aged and published by the Virtual Organiza-
tion Membership Service (VOMS) (inert part
[VOMS]). A registration in VOMS implies a
registration for a default role in a default group.
The attributes that unambiguously identify VO
members (and thus implicitly Grid jobs execut-
ing on behalf of them) are encoded inX.509End
Entity Certificates (EEC) (inert part [EEC]) and
proxy certificates (inert part [Proxy]) derived
from EECs. Proxies are signed by an attribute
authority, in this case VOMS. VO memberships
have a life cycle which is expressed by the FSM-
driven behavior in part VO. Finally, a (middle-
ware specific) Grid Job Manager allows only
valid Grid jobs (part [Job Mgr]) to “consume”
Grid resources.
Starting from the initial global state (indicated
by the black phase tokens in DGAF0), we can
easily derive several global properties ofDGAF.
1. Resource access is only granted upon pre-
senting a valid proxy certificate (based on
a valid EEC) and the corresponding EEC
owner has to be registered in VOMS as a
VO member (an “applicant” status is not
enough).
2. Resource access may nonetheless be denied
even for a valid Grid job. A typical scenario
would be the unavailability of a required re-
source.
3. VO applicants will get member status once
they are registered in the VOMS system.
4. VO memberships need to be deleted from
the VOMS system upon membership termi-
nation (enforcement (member, registered)).
5. Any invalidation of an EEC requires the im-
mediate co-invalidation of all derived proxy
certificates.
Figure 3. Excerpt from the D-Grid authorization framework [7] (Model DGAF0)
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From the discussion before, it should be obvious
that further restrictions (e.g., certificate revoca-
tion lists, credential repositories) can be added
incrementally.
Survivability assessment generally follows a
multistage process [6] consisting of an essential
property assessment, an incident assessment,
and a strategy definition to sustain survivabil-
ity. In the followingwe will briefly demonstrate
how FIS can be applied to support these stages.
Essential Property Assessment
One (there may be many) DGAF mission state-
ment is ‘‘to avoid resource access grants
without a valid certificate’’.
This mission neither requires VOMS to execute
nor a VO to operate. It only requires the mu-
tual exclusion of the phases not valid ∈ [EEC]
and access ∈ [Resource]. In FIS terms, this
translates into the specification of a strong IS-
folding the target IS of which (DGAF1) is given
in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Essential property for DGAF derived from
IS-foldings (Model DGAF1)
The folded parts and phases are indicated by
angle brackets and are renamed appropriately.
Without going into details, DGAF1 was de-
rived from DGAF0 by folding the inert parts
[Role], [Group], [VOMS], [EEC] and [Proxy]
into [< authz >] and the autonomous parts VO
and Job Mgr into < Requestor >. Please note
that the DGAF mission still holds in DGAF1.
Incident Assessment
In FIS we are able to express incidents as devia-
tions from the nominal model defined at design
time to specify the “correct service” [4]. Devi-
ations either occur as illegal restrictions or as
invalid extensions.
For example, an unintended permanent resource
access can be forced – provided thiswas granted
before once – by adding a part construct like the
one in Figure 5 (part “Disaster”). In a simi-
lar way, accessing a Grid resource despite an
invalid EEC can be achieved by adding one or
more uncoupled phases to part Job Mgr allow-
ing for unintended transitions. Generally, inci-
dents are (in FIS terms) “combinations” of IS
(the nominal one and models describing intru-
sions) integrated by IS-foldings.
Figure 5. Unintended permanent resource access
(behavior restriction)
It should be noticed that the detection of in-
cidents requires suitable mechanisms to distin-
guish “invalid” behavior from intended behav-
ior (self/non-self tolerance). This topic will be
addressed in more detail in a follow-up paper.
Strategies for Sustaining Survivability
Formally speaking, mission fulfillment means
transforming the system from a non-safe global
state into an again-safe global state with at least
all essential properties preserved. There are
several strategies to achieve this transformation.
They can be derived directly from the model.
We briefly mention just three.
1. The cut-off strategy aims at achieving mis-
sion survivability by cutting off system parts.
It assumes undamaged essential properties .
2. The peripheral tolerance strategy aims at ex-
tending the system in such a way that the
damaging parts (the periphery) are tolerated.
3. The degeneracy strategy aims at “multiply
providing” some (or all) critical system com-
ponents over structurally different parts (de-
generacy).
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An in-depth discussion of transformation strate-
gies is beyond the scope of this paper and will
be presented elsewhere.
5. Related Work
The FIS-approach is based on the IS frame-
work which has been shown to be more ex-
pressive than comparable modeling methodolo-
gies like Petri Nets or communicating FSM [5].
The latter ones suffer from inherent difficul-
ties in enunciating restrictions, violations, and
enforcements. Additionally, the intrinsic pos-
sibility of incrementally modeling in-the-large
reveals a further advantage of IS. The IS frame-
work has, however, not been applied for mod-
eling property preservation (like survivability)
in “compromised environments”. The folding
mechanisms we presented here are examples to
close this gap.
Survivability of IT systems, on the other hand,
is a relatively new research area with a precise
definition of what to achieve and a common un-
derstanding of the means how to achieve the
goals still lacking. Nonetheless, there are al-
ready some more or less mature architectures
available with mostly domain specific modeling
frameworks [8]. None of them, however, pro-
vides a formally sound modeling framework or
a practical methodology for dealing with incre-
mental restrictions. Emergent algorithms have
been proposed in [1] for achieving survivability.
Although a promising approach, they require a
global observer and do not provide an adequate
model for reasoning about propagation of influ-
ences.
Related work is also performed in the auto-
nomic computing community when studying
self*-mechanisms [9]. The autonomic mod-
els include very interesting control loops con-
structs, but do not allow reasoning about mutual
exclusions of local states and influence propa-
gations.
6. Conclusion and Further Work
Survivability is a global system property. A
problem arises when studying survivability in
unbounded systems as there is no central con-
trol and the system components only have a
limited view on the system-as-a-whole. In such
systems, global properties can only be achieved
by purposefully influencing bilateral interac-
tions to propagate. A comprehensive modeling
framework for investigating the global effects of
local activities is missing. We proposed Folded
Interaction Systems (FIS) as such a framework.
FIS uses the Interaction Systems framework for
describing system structures and interactions
between components and introduces the con-
cept IS-foldings to derive essential system ca-
pabilities, to describe incidents, and to derive
survivability sustaining strategies. We demon-
strated the appropriateness of FIS by applying
it to the analysis of a production Grid authoriza-
tion framework.
The work presented here is a first cornerstone
of a comprehensive “survivability toolkit” for
unbounded systems including runtime incident
detection capabilities and dynamic overwrite
mechanisms.
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